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Research shows that peacekeepers reduce conflict intensity; however, effects of deployment 
on non-political violence are unknown. This article focuses on criminal violence and 
proposes a two-fold mechanism to explain why peacekeeping missions, even when 
effectively reducing conflict, can inadvertently increase criminal violence. First, less conflict 
opens up economic opportunities (so-called peacekeeping economies) and provides 
operational security for organized crime, thus increasing violent competition among criminal 
groups. Second, demobilized combatants are vulnerable to turn to crime because of limited 
legal livelihood opportunities and their training in warfare. While UN troops may exacerbate 
these dynamics, UN police peculiar role is likely to successfully contain criminal violence. 
Cross-national and subnational empirical analyses show that large UN military deployments 
result in higher homicide rates whereas UN police, overall, moderates this collateral effect. 
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The United Nations (UN) has adapted its strategy of intervention to face specific challenges 
of civil wars, moving away from traditional missions toward multidimensional approaches 
and broader mandates. Mandates’ objectives are primarily conflict-related; thus, assessments 
of peacekeeping effectiveness have reasonably focused on its impact on political violence. 
But among several threats to peace, criminal actors have emerged as particularly threatening 
to short and long-term stability. The sharp increase in homicides and organized crime in El 
Salvador, Haiti, Kosovo, Ivory Coast and Mali forced the UN to adapt and change the scope 
of mandates to include crime-related tasks. Criminal networks act as peace spoilers by 
disrupting or delaying stabilization, infiltrating and undermining government’s legitimacy 
and threatening civilians’ security. With the UN also acknowledging the risks of pervasive 
criminal violence for peacebuilding, a comprehensive assessment of peacekeeping 
effectiveness calls for more attention to broad security implications of peace missions.  
Existing research agrees that peacekeeping works because it reduces lethality, 
duration and diffusion of civil wars (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Beardsley 
and Gleditsch 2015; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). This scholarship, however, 
focuses on violence perpetrated by armed political actors and largely neglects violence 
perpetrated by non-politically motivated actors – above all, criminal actors. Are UN 
peacekeepers as effective in deterring criminal violence as they are in deterring political 
violence? 
This manuscript contributes to two strands of literature on conflict and peace. First, it 
contributes to peacekeeping literature by focusing on a form of violence that is not considered 
in other studies and is all the same deleterious, namely criminal violence. By focusing on 
homicides rather than other types of non-violent crimes, the findings of the article directly 
speak to extant scholarship concluding that peacekeepers can provide security and 
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stabilization. Showing that this is likely true for conflict but not for criminal violence adds 
important nuance to our understanding of effectiveness and intervention policies.  Second, it 
proposes an additional channel that explains why conflict and post-conflict countries exhibit 
high levels of crime by investigating the role of international military interventions. I show 
that military peacekeepers inadvertently increase criminal violence through two proposed 
mechanisms working at individual and group level. First, UN troops improve security by 
reducing conflict intensity and, simultaneously, providing ‘operational security’ that 
organized crime needs for business. In addition, local peacekeeping economies that emerge 
where UN staff is deployed create more opportunities for illegal activities. Criminal groups 
engage in violent competition to appropriate these new profit opportunities, thus producing 
higher levels of criminal violence. Second, peacekeeping economies promote predatory 
behaviours also among individuals, especially demobilized combatants. They lack marketable 
livelihood skills and have incentives to put their fighting skills at the service of criminal 
groups, which are not targeted by demobilization programs and peacekeeping mandates. 
Though the mechanisms support the hypothesis that peacekeeping exacerbates criminal 
violence, missions with substantial UN police (UNPOL) deployment provide vital support to 
public order and national law enforcement apparatus, thus countering criminal violence.  
UNPOL’s involvement in capacity building, community patrolling and law 
enforcement explains the negative association with criminal violence. The empirical evidence 
for these arguments is based on a country-year sample and a subnational analysis on the UN 
mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). At both levels analysis, results indicate higher homicide 
rates following the deployment of large UN troop contingents, while UNPOL is associated 
with lower homicide rates. Interestingly, UNPOL moderates the crime-increasing effect of 
UN troops when deployed alongside. The conclusions discuss the key policy implications of 
these findings.  
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Criminal violence in conflict and post-conflict societies 
Scholarship on the relationship between criminal violence and stability consists of two main 
strands that do not necessarily stand in opposition to each other, namely the political 
economy and the cultural account. The political economy of crime adopts a rational choice 
perspective, which posits that criminal acts are the result of cost–benefit trade-offs, where the 
gains from the action outweigh the risk of being punished (Becker 1968). Both institutional 
capacity and economic opportunities matter for these calculations since low state capacity, 
poverty and inequalities make the ideal scenario for high crime incidence. In conflict and 
post-conflict contexts, we find both state weakness and economic opportunities for crime. 
Furthermore, major political shocks, including wars or revolution create the power vacuum 
necessary for criminal groups to emerge and thrive (Skaperdas 2001).  
Relatedly, the cultural argument hinges on the observation that society does not 
immediately shift to peace when political conflict declines. Civil wars normalize violence, 
hence war-torn societies tend to internalize new norms and values that favour the social 
permissiveness of violence and crime (Archer and Gartner 1976; Steenkamp 2005). This 
cultural explanation of high crime rates in post-conflict settings is compatible with the social 
disorganization theory argument, according to which variation in delinquency and crime rates 
is explained by the disruption of formal and informal community networks (Sampson and 
Groves 1989). Hence, conflict and post-conflict societies are more likely to experience rapid 
growth in violent and non-violent crimes because war alters the normative order and 
decreases social organization.  
It follows that states weakened by civil wars provide ideal conditions for criminal 
activities. The decline of state authority and its inability to fulfil core functions opens up 
space for criminal actors, ranging from street gangs to more organized mafia-like groups. 
However, differently from insurgent groups that aim to overthrow the government, criminals 
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prefer under-provision of governance over total anarchy (Hazen 2010; Kalyvas and Kocher 
2009). Clunan and Trinkunas observe that the illicit economies is not ungoverned, rather 
differently governed since “total chaos and complete removal of the governing authority pose 
critical threats to the survival of the illicit (and licit) economies” (2010, 179).  
In addition, relatively safe environments reduce losses and encourage potential 
buyers. If a region is torn by war, trading becomes particularly risky, even more so if criminal 
actors (individuals or groups) do not have their own armed militia and have to rely on 
outsourced security. While mafias can provide security to themselves and sell it to others 
(Gambetta 1995), most criminal groups that are less powerful and organized do not have 
resources to carry the burden of providing security while also conducting their business. 
Some criminal groups thus prefer the state or other actors to provide minimum levels of 
governance and security, which they can either free-ride or buy, as in the case of Somali 
pirates  buying protection from clan leaders (Shortland and Varese 2014). 
State weakness is a permissive condition not only for organized criminal groups but 
also for individuals. Civil wars turn societies into crime-facilitative and crime-coercive 
systems in which structural conditions (namely incentives, opportunity and immunity) make 
crime rewarding (Needleman and Needleman 1979). In coping economies, crime represents 
the only available survival strategy for segments of the population. The unprecedented 
increase in opium production in post-2001 Afghanistan was not a consequence of greedy 
farmers switching opportunistically from legal to illegal crops; rather, for the majority of poor 
households it was a matter of survival (Goodhand 2005; Bove and Gavrilova 2017). 
Conflict and post-conflict societies are likely to experience high levels of criminal 
violence, because in these societies crime and violence are not only permitted (by society 
and, unwittingly, by weak institutions) but also induced by a war-ravaged economy. How do 
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peacekeepers affect these dynamics when deployed? In most countries, criminal violence is 
high during and in the aftermath of a civil war, but can peacekeeping make a difference? I 
will argue that UNPOL can achieve deterrence but the impact of military peacekeepers is less 
clear-cut. Instead of deterring crime, troops may even exacerbate criminal violence as an 
unintended consequence of insurgents-focused mandates and the economic stimulus triggered 
by their presence.  
Do peace missions boost criminal violence? 
In this section, I elaborate on how personnel types have distinct impact on criminal violence. 
The crime-reducing effect of police is extensively supported in the economy of crime 
literature (Chalfin and McCrary 2017). The effect of UN troops, however, is not necessarily 
unidirectional and requires further discussion. On the one hand, UN troops may be able to 
deter any form of armed violence, regardless of its purpose. On the other hand, criminal 
violence may respond differently to peacekeeping because of specific dynamics that 
generates this form of violence. Below, I put forward group and individual -level mechanisms 
through which peacekeeping could inadvertently promote rather than deter criminal violence. 
At both levels, improvements in security and stimuli to local economies have important 
implications for the incidence of crime-related violence.  
 
Organized Crime and Peacekeeping 
The priority of UN mission is to restore minimal levels of security by reducing violence and 
disarming combatants to lower the chances of relapse into armed conflict. This objective is a 
priority for both traditional and multidimensional interventions because state-building, 
economic and social reforms require stability in the first place. Peacekeeping missions with 
large military personnel reduces conflict intensity and casualties (Hultman, Kathman, and 
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Shannon 2013, 2014). Sizeable UN military presence is thus a credible deterrent for political 
actors and effectively reduces incentives to fight. Notably, however, peacekeepers’ 
effectiveness in reducing political violence “provide[s] a minimum level of stability and 
predictability which can unintentionally facilitate illicit economic exchange” (Andreas 2009, 
34). As already mentioned, organized criminals need “operational security to plan, prepare, 
and conduct their illicit activities” (Patrick 2011, 135-136). The decline of political violence 
creates more favourable environments for criminal entrepreneurs. As UN troops reduce 
violence monthly (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014), organized crime benefits from 
these improvements since early stages of the mission. Several cases provide evidence of this 
pattern. In a survey conducted in Haiti, Kolbe finds that affiliation with gangs started 
increasing just after peacekeepers arrived in Port-au-Prince in 2004, and peaked in 2006; 
when MINUSTAH’s presence increased just after the 2010 earthquake, gang affiliation rose 
again (Kolbe 2013). 
The second mission–specific effect is economic. The arrival of UN personnel turns 
the local economy into a so-called “peacekeeping economy” (Jennings and Nikolić-
Ristanović 2009). Peacekeeping stimulates the local economy in several ways, for example, 
increasing employment opportunities and wages (Bove and Gavrilova 2017). In some 
circumstances, peacekeeping economies foster illicit activities that are made possible by 
peacekeepers presence. In particular, missions boost black markets in economies that are 
already criminalized and “absorb” external actors, whose direct involvement further fuels 
illicit exchanges (Andreas 2008). Besides black markets, peacekeepers arrival also increases 
demand of sex workers, resulting in more transactional sex and human trafficking (Beber et 
al. 2017; Bell, Flynn, and Martinez Machain 2018), especially when deployment is sizeable 
and violence decreases (Nordås and Rustad 2013). Even when peacekeepers do not actively 
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participate to illicit activities, the impact of the deployment is economically profitable for 
organized crime.  
Hence, the combination of the security and economic effect of peace operations hints 
that criminal groups will i) be able to free-ride on the security provided by peacekeepers 
without having to fear state punishment, and ii) become more exploitative as direct result of 
peacekeeping economies. Since the state is unable to counter them and the mission focuses 
on political actors, criminal groups are largely unaffected by the external intervention.  
Intuitively, the larger missions are more likely to produce the security and economic 
effects described above. Increased opportunities for predatory behaviour will produce more 
competition among criminal actors, which oftentimes involves violence (Kalyvas 2015; 
Moro, Petrella, and Sberna 2014). Contrary to this expectation, it is often argued that 
homicides drop significantly when organized crime is doing business; thus low homicide 
rates are a function of solid territorial control (Cockayne and Lupel 2011). However, this idea 
that criminal groups do not use violence in their home territory is mostly derived from studies 
of Italian mafias, whether this is generalizable to Africa or other contexts is debatable. 
African criminal groups exhibit loose structures and temporary business-oriented formations 
that do not allow them to establish actual territorial control (Abadinsky 2007; Mazzitelli 
2007).  
 
Individual Criminals and Peacekeeping 
The security and economic effect of peacekeeping has implications also for individuals that 
are not embedded in organized crime. First, incentives for predatory behaviour associated 
with peacekeeping economies exist not only for group members but also for individuals. 
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Particularly vulnerable to this are ex-combatants. In order to reduce the risk of re-escalation, 
UN missions often launch DDR programs (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration). 
Disarmament aims at reducing ongoing violence, but reintegration of combatants to civilian 
life plays an equally relevant role for the peace process.  
DDR programs can produce undesirable consequences if former combatants are not 
successfully reintegrated because economic insecurity may drive them toward crime. Ex-
combatants are more vulnerable as they usually lack education and do not have strong 
marketable skills, thus have limited alternatives for earning money legally (Muggah 2008; 
Patel, DeGreiff, and Waldorf 2010). Their main skill is the use of violence and familiarity 
with weapons (Collier 1994; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2010). After being disarmed, 
they find themselves in a context where these skills are neither rewarded nor replaced by new 
ones, thus increasing the risk of recidivism (Kaplan and Nussio 2018; Phayal, Khadka, and 
Thye 2015).   According to the World Bank Development Report (2011), individuals joining 
rebellion do not differ much from those joining criminal gangs with regard to motivations. 
However, in a context where the only credible sanctioning power is the UN mission, which 
primarily focuses on rebel groups, it is more reasonable to join criminal networks. Different 
from armed groups, gangs and criminal organizations are not subject to disarmament 
programs.  
It could be argued that demobilisation leads to crime waves in all post-conflict 
settings, regardless of peacekeepers. Two things are worth noting, though. First, peacekeepers 
implement DDR programs both during and after conflict, which is why I do not exclusively 
focus on the post-conflict phase. Second, UN has the capacity to implement country-wide 
DDR programs, while government-led implementations are much less systematic. 
Furthermore, insurgents are less likely to join government-led DDR programs in absence of 
external security guarantors such as the UN. Thus, on the one hand, peacekeepers assist 
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disarmament and demobilization processes by deploying to different locations, collecting 
weapons while also acting as security guarantor. On the other hand, the reintegration phase is 
a very long-term process and relies mostly on non-military, local actors. The UN can 
limitedly support the reintegration phase by assisting NGO and government projects for 
employment and vocational training, providing infrastructures and supporting economic 
recovery; but successful reintegration is not as quick as disarming and is not simply about 
reinserting ex-combatants into communities. Thus, large missions smoothly disarm and 
demobilize combatants but their contribution to reintegration is negligible, thus leaving many 
vulnerable to turning to crime and criminal networks in the short run. These dynamics are 
common to many DDR processes, as in Mozambique, South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua 
and Cambodia (Knight and Özerdem 2004). Veterans might be more prone to such 
behaviours, because of their recent history of violence and the criminalization of demobilized 
wartime networks by former high and mid-rank commanders (Themnér 2015, Daly, Paler, 
and Samii 2016, Nussio 2018). 
 
The role of UN troops and police 
Overall, I expect large UN missions to increase criminal violence in host-states. More 
specifically, UN troops should be associated with more criminal violence because of their 
direct impact on security and local economy. Conversely, UNPOL has potential to decrease 
criminal violence. The main function of UNPOL involves two main tasks, namely i) 
prevention, detection and investigation of crimes and maintenance of public order, and ii) 
support for the restructuring and reform of host-state police though training, mentoring, 
advising, and joint patrolling. By performing these tasks, UNPOL can support violent crimes 
reduction both directly through deterrence (e.g. patrolling and operations) and indirectly 
	 10	
through offenders’ incapacitation (e.g. arrests). The latter effect, in particular, hinges on the 
role of UNPOL as capacity-builders, hence does not require deployments as extensive as 
military ones because few officers are needed to train hundreds of host-state counterparts.1 
But the more immediate impact of UNPOL through deterrence is the result of joint operations 
and high visibility patrols carried out with national police and provision of material support. 
Numerous studies confirm that the crime-reducing effect of police is largely due to deterrence 
rather than incapacitation (Chalfin and McCrary 2017; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004). Not 
surprisingly, the operational guidelines for UNPOL in DDR settings clearly highlight the role 
of patrolling as crime deterrent (UN 2014), even if mandates do not allow to arrest and detain 
criminals. Crime-reduction literature shows that high visibility police patrols signal the 
presence of a sanctioning force and thus effectively reduce crimes, including firearms crimes 
(McGarrell, Chermak, and Weiss 2001). While executive mandates have only been 
authorized in Kosovo and East Timor, UNPOL contribution to the mission planning is pivotal 
as it provides important expertise on organized crime and public order. UN military, on the 
other hand, are less well equipped against criminal violence. First, troops tend to believe that 
policing activities are a distraction from their primary responsibilities (Perito 2004). Second, 
military lack flexibility and expertise in maintaining public order, which usually involves 
low-intensity violence.  
It was the UNPOL, not UN troops, that conducted a very successful offensive against 
gangs in Haiti and assisted the Haitian police in setting up 2,000 checkpoints to arrest more 
than 4,500 suspects2; in Liberia, UNPOL participated to Operation Sweeping Wave whose 
aim was to defeat organized crime involved in drug dealing, such as the Isakaba Gang. 
Similar operations were conducted in Sierra Leone, with several successes including arrest of 
																																																													
1 For example, the trainer-to-recruit ratio was 1:10 in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and 1:8 in Liberia (UNMIL). 
2 UNPOL website publishes information on the counter-crime activities listed in this paragraph, for more 
information see https://police.un.org/en/un-police-magazine.  
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200 suspects and seizure of hundreds of kilograms of cannabis, heroin and cocaine. In East 
Timor, UNPOL contributed to successful arrest of several human traffickers by Timorese 
police. Also, in DRC UNPOL joint checkpoints with Congolese police (Operation SOLIB) 
deterred criminals from accessing the axis Beni-Mavivi and reduced criminality, which in 
turn allowed people to return to their villages. To conclude, UN troops can provide security 
against military threats but are of (almost) no help in rebuilding domestic security.  
 Based on the above discussion, I formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1: UN troops have a positive effect on criminal violence 
H2: UN police has a negative effect on criminal violence 
Empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis is divided is two parts. First, I use country-year as unit of analysis 
with national-level statistics on homicide rates in countries that experienced civil wars from 
1995 to 2012. This allows me to include most of the countries that hosted a UN mission after 
the Cold War. The second stage moves to the subnational and monthly level by focusing on 
UN mission in South Sudan. Inclusion of other cases is limited by lack of subnational crime 
statistics for countries hosting peace missions. To operationalize criminal violence, as 
discussed later, I use homicide rates per 100,000 population as dependent variable and 
estimate a Panel Corrected Standard Errors model (PCSE) (Beck and Katz 1995) with 
correction for temporal autocorrelation within panels (AR1). For the cross-national analysis, I 
also include country fixed effects and region-year fixed effects to account for region specific 
shocks in a given year.3 This strategy addresses measurement errors due to the pooling of 
different homicide data sources, assuming that the error is “systematically related to the 
country, but does not change much over time” (Neumayer 2003: 628).  
																																																													
3 Regions are Africa, Asia, Europe and Central America.  
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Empirical studies on peacekeeping need to tackle the problem that peacekeepers are 
not randomly deployed; usually the most violent conflicts and locations host peacekeepers 
(Fortna 2003; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016). This is 
problematic when one wants to assess the effect of peacekeeping on political violence. 
However, crime and more specifically homicide rates are not among the main drivers of 
mission deployment. UN mandates are not designed to reduce crime. While I do not argue 
that the mission is completely exogenous to criminal violence, I believe that the selection bias 
is a less threatening issue for statistical inference. Statistical models confirm this intuition 
when coarsened exact matching (CEM; Iacus, King, and Porro 2011) is used to alleviate 
selection bias and model dependence.  
Dependent variable: Homicide Rates 
Violence is classified as criminal or political depending on perpetrators’ intentions. I 
operationalize criminal violence with intentional homicides rates. Homicide rates are strongly 
associated with presence of criminal groups. The Handbook for European Homicide Research 
also states that “homicide rates are generally accepted as both the most reliably measured 
crime and as an accurate indicator of a nation’s overall level of criminal violence” (Liem and 
Pridemore 2012). Hence, the dependent variable of the analysis is homicide rates per 100,000 
populations. For the country-year analysis, I use UNODC homicide rates in countries that are 
either in conflict or within 5 year from conflict termination. UNODC combines homicides 
from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Crime Trend Surveys (UN-CTS). 
Intentional homicides, in particular, are defined as “death deliberately inflicted on a person 
by another person, including infanticide” (UN Statistical Division 2003, 91). These data 
provide the best indicator for homicide rates and has been already used in cross-national 
studies on crime (Neumayer 2003, 2005; Ouimet 2012; Rivera 2016). For South Sudan, I use 
crime statistics reports published by the South Sudan National Police. These reports, 
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published with the support of the UN Development Program, cover all months and states 
from June 2011 to March 2013 (SSPS 2011-2013). The Appendix (Section A10, p.19) 
presents a possible validation of these statistics through a comparison with crime 
victimization as reported in World Bank Surveys in the years 2012-2014. 
Independent variable 
The independent variables of interest are the size of UN troops and UNPOL units deployed. 
Information on the size of UN personnel at the country level is from IPI. For subnational 
deployment, I rely on UN Secretary General reports, which often include maps with 
peacekeepers’ location. These maps are combined with data from the International Peace 
Institute (IPI) on contribution to peace missions to estimate the size of UN units in each 
location (see sample map and the output of the procedure in Section A3, Appendix p.8; this 
strategy is also used in Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis (2016)). 
Control variables 
For the cross-national analysis, I add a set of lagged control variables that are expected to be 
associated with homicide rates and peacekeeping. First, I include battle-related deaths from 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4 (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015) to control for 
overall levels of conflict-related violence. The models also include dummies for ceasefires, 
DDR provisions in the peace agreement  and post-conflict years retrieved from UCDP peace 
agreement dataset (Högbladh 2011, Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006) and the 
conflict termination dataset (Kreutz 2010). I also include State Fragility Index from the 
Centre for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Cole 2014), which includes indicators for 
governance, socio-economic development and security. Population and GDP are also 
included from Gleditsch (2002), the most complete source for these two measures. In the 
Appendix, I show additional specifications with other control variables that unfortunately are 
not available for several countries in the sample (Section A9, p.17). 
	 14	
The control variables for the subnational analysis cannot be identical to the above 
because those indicators are not available for each South Sudanese state by month. However, 
I keep the battery of variables as consistent as possible. First, population density is measured 
yearly at the state level according to the national statistics (NBS 2014). Urban share and 
poverty incidence are time-invariant and measure respectively the share of population living 
in urban area, the share of population with below minimum welfare levels in 2009 (NBS 
2011). I add state control as measured by the number of police station in each state, (SSPS 
reports). To account for conflict intensity, monthly killings reported in UCDP-GED are 
factored in (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Furthermore, I add a spatial lag for homicides to 
control for potential diffusion. Finally, I do not add DDR or post-conflict since both always 
equal 1 in the period under analysis. All independent variables are temporally lagged to 
alleviate endogeneity. Descriptive statistics for the cross-national and subnational variables 
are in Section A1 (Appendix, p.3). 
 
Potential threats to inference 
Before presenting the results, I discuss three threats to causal inference and how I propose to 
alleviate them. The first one concerns whether the homicide variable is also capturing 
political violence. The argument that homicides are a good proxy for criminal violence hinges 
on the assumption that reported homicides are not politically motivated. In principle, it 
should then be possible to distinguish political and criminal violence. In practice however, it 
is difficult to empirically pin down criminal violence. It is no surprise that crime statistics are 
imperfect. In South Sudan, these were collected with the support of the UN Development 
Program (UNDP), which suggests reasonable data quality. As for the quality of the data for 
cross-country comparisons, I explained how country-fixed effects reduce concerns over 
comparability. Additionally, I also follow Neumayer’s strategy (2003) and show that 
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averaging variables across three years to reduce the influence of exceptionally high/low 
values does not change the results (Section A8, Appendix p.16).  
Yet, one could argue that homicides proxy political rather than criminal violence. 
First, this implies that homicide rates should correlate with conflict data; however, the 
scatterplot of political and criminal violence across countries shows low levels of correlation 
(Section A4, Appendix p.9). Second, in line with negative relationship found in the most 
recent literature on peacekeeping, I should not observe the expected positive effect of 
peacekeeping but instead a decrease in homicides. Hence, if the argument that homicides 
simply mirror conflict is true and still a positive effect is found, the latter is likely to be an 
underestimation of the true effect. More importantly, the effects of troops and police on 
homicides should have the same direction; however, I will show that these two types of 
personnel still have opposite impact on homicides.  
Slightly different is the case where political violence is miscategorised as criminal 
violence. As argued by Autesserre (2010), peacebuilders in DRC have interpreted local 
violence as instances of criminal and private violence rather than political. This suggests that 
international interveners can wrongly perceive the nature of violence and thus its 
characterization as criminal. In collecting homicide data in South Sudan, UNDP was not 
unaware of these challenges. UNDP adhered to the widely accepted definition of intentional 
homicides and adopted a set of criteria to exclude conflict deaths from the counting, mostly 
examining whether there was a direct link between the death and the conflict. For example, a 
death involving non-combatants is classified as intentional homicide. This does not allow to 
distinguish homicides from conflict deaths when at least one party is plausibly linked to a 
party in conflict, neither it solves the misperception problem acknowledged by Autesserre; 
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however, it suggests that the data collection was based on some criteria that, when used 
systematically, would alleviate miscounting.4  
Second, the causal mechanisms cannot all be tested separately since we do not have data 
on each step of the chain. However, I provide more support for the plausibility of my theory 
with two empirical tests. First, I replicate the analysis using an international expert survey on 
organized crime as in Pinotti (2015) instead of homicides. Flourishing of organized crime 
during peacekeeping economies is one of the mechanisms I propose to link UN missions and 
higher homicide rates. I find confirmation that UN troops are associated with (emergence of) 
organized crime, while police have a negative impact on it (Section A6, Appendix p.11). This 
is also consistent subnationally, where I use counterfeiting to measure organized crime. In 
particular, counterfeiting is one of the most common activities of organized crime in South 
Sudan, so it is plausible proxy for criminal groups. In Section A6 (Appendix), I also find that 
counterfeiting is associated with large UN military presence. Second, and even more 
importantly, a falsification regression shows that total crime rates are not affected at all by 
peacekeepers (Section A7, Appendix p.12). These regressions confute two crucial points. 
First, peacekeepers presence does not result in generalized rise/drop in reported crimes; and 
second, not all crimes, but specifically homicide and organized crime-related felonies, 
increase where UN troops are deployed, and decline when UNPOL is present. These very 
important results are further discussed in Appendix.  
																																																													
4 Grady (2016) flags some important issues concerning UN missions’ efforts to collect data on sexual 
exploitation and abuses (SEA), but it is worth highlighting two key differences with UNDP support on data 
collection. First, the SEA reports have consequences on the missions’ reputation and legitimacy is at stake. SEA 
allegations undoubtedly cast a shadow on the mission’s conduct, while conversely, bad crime statistics do not 
necessarily reflect negatively on the mission. Second, reporting on SEA does not involve any effort to build 
statistical capacity of local institutions, nor the mission itself has expertise on such matters. The UNDP, on the 
other hand, provides exactly that type of expertise. 
 
	 17	
Third, reporting bias could be a concern for the subnational analysis, where data was 
collected with UN assistance. The test mentioned above reduces the credibility of such issue 
since not all crimes are affected by peacekeepers’ presence. Still, it could be argued that 
homicides are more reported in locations where UNPOL supports the national police. Hence, 
peacekeepers will be associated with higher homicide counts. If these reporting biases are 
severely affecting the results, I should find a positive coefficient for UNPOL, in particular. 
What the analysis reveals, in fact, is that UNPOL is associated with fewer homicides and only 
UN troops have positive coefficient. A different form of bias concerns UN presence resulting 
in more reported homicides as consequence of an intentional mis-categorization of political 
killings as criminal killings. However, this implies a negative correlation between political 
and criminal violence, which, as mentioned, is very close to zero in fact.  
A fourth concern is that ungoverned spaces where state is absent explain both deployment 
and homicides, thus indicating a spurious relationship. Particularly at the subnational level, 
pockets of no-governance are common. While measuring degrees of un(der)-governance is a 
challenge, there are some important features of the research design that would rule out this 
alternative explanation. First, the subnational analysis includes the logged number of police 
stations in each state, which is a proxy for state presence. Second, all states in South Sudan 
host peacekeepers, thus the underlying selection process is not whether to send peacekeepers 
or not; rather it is about how many should be sent, which is in turn driven by conflict 
intensity. Under-provision of state capacity would be a more severe problem if some units did 
not receive peacekeepers at all. Third, since the time window I analyse subnationally is 
relatively narrow (18 months), I expect no significant temporal variation in degrees of state 
capacity, which is a slow-moving factor. This means that fixed effects would correct for this 
unobserved heterogeneity, given its assumed time-invariance in the sample.  
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The challenges discussed in this paragraph warn us from drawing causal conclusions from the 
analysis, which is why this article refrains from using causal language. However, the 
following analysis is clearly indicative of a plausible impact that peace operations may have 
on criminal violence. 
Country-level Analysis 
The cross-national sample includes countries that experienced internal conflict from 1995 to 
2012. Countries enter the dataset if they experience violent conflict in a given year and leave 
after 5 consecutive years of peace. Figure 1 shows all countries in the sample, distinguishing 
those that hosted peacekeeping operations (blue-striped) from others (grey). Overall, 58 
countries experienced conflict, and the UN intervened in 19 of these instances. Including both 
countries that hosted and did not host UN missions is important to distinguish whether 
increasing trends in crime are comparable across all civil wars or peacekeepers played a role 
in this process. In other words, by including both scenarios with and without UN 
peacekeepers, I can investigate if peacekeepers’ presence altered otherwise similar trends of 
criminal violence.  Figure 2 plots average annual homicide rates in countries included in the 
sample. Hollow circles are yearly country observations.5 On average, Figure 2 shows that 
homicide rates are lower in countries with UN peace missions (blue line). The peak around 
1995 and 1996 is El Salvador, the main outlier in the sample.6  
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
																																																													
5 Plots in the article are created in Stata (v. 15) using Plottig (Bischof 2018). Maps are created in ArcGIS (v. 
10.5.1). 
6 The rate of homicides for El Salvador in 1995 is 139 – almost 8,000 cases of intentional killing – the 
maximum value in the sample. Results do not change when El Salvador is excluded (not shown). 
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Figure 2 does not counter the argument that peacekeepers presence may favour inducing 
environments for criminal violence. The argument of this manuscript is that sizeable military 
operations accelerate the unfolding of conditions that produce more criminal violence.  
 
Estimation and results 
One assumption of Hypothesis 1 linking homicides and peace missions is that UN troops 
reduce battle-related violence. This assumption is empirically supported in Hultman, 
Kathman and Shannon's (henceforth HKS, 2014) study on peacekeeping in Africa. In their 
sample (1992-2011 African countries in civil wars), UN armed personnel effectively reduced 
monthly political violence. The hypothesis I formulate hinges in part on this stabilizing effect 
that blue helmets have on host-states, whose fluctuations, we have seen, could drive criminal 
violence trends. Since existing studies find that UN personnel reduce conflict, I expect this to 
spur more homicides because of the security and economic effect provoked by large UN 
missions.  
Given the relevance of this mechanism, I begin by analysing HKS data with yearly 
temporal aggregation. The results Model 1 (Table 1) are in line with expectations as UN 
military is associated with less violence in the subsequent period, while no significant effect 
is found for UNPOL. Armed personnel, more specifically troops, have a curbing effect on 
political violence because it signals stronger commitment. Consequently, the theoretical 
argument that, by reducing political violence, peacekeepers foster more criminal violence is 
likely to be observed in the African case. 
In Models 2 and 3 I use homicide rates as dependent variable, and include all control 
variables from HKS. Peacekeeping missions are coded with a dummy variable in Model 2, 
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which does not report a significant coefficient.7 Model 3 disaggregates personnel type and 
size, and indicates that only UNPOL is significantly associated with fewer homicides in the 
next year, while a positive and significant coefficient is reported for UN troops. Since the 
main task of troops is to deter political violence, it is likely that their deterring role has the 
counterproductive effect of spurring criminal violence. Differently, UNPOL is associated 
with reduced criminal violence as its main responsibilities are rule of law, joint policing with 
national police and capacity-building, all activities that deter crimes. To some extent, police 
and troops may affect criminal violence in opposite ways as result of their effectiveness in 
performing their roles. Interestingly on control variables, DDR programs relate with 
increasing homicide rates, which is consistent with the individual-level argument proposed. 
Furthermore, all else equal, countries with ceasefires and within 5 years from conflict 
termination are also less likely to experience rising levels of criminal violence. Finally, 
conflict violence negatively correlates with homicides as hypothesized although the 
coefficient does not reach statistical significance. Appendix (Section A5, p.10) digs into this 
relation and shows that there is a threshold beyond which conflict reduction is accompanied 
by a concurrent reduction in criminal violence. Indeed, missions that fail to provide any 
degree of security are unlikely to have an impact of criminal violence; but when missions are 
particularly successful and almost eliminate conflict-related violence, these improvements 
will also be beneficial for crime reduction.   
																																																													
7 In additional analysis, I use International Military Intervention data (Pickering and Kisangani 2009) to control 
for other interveners in the host country. The main results for UN personnel do not change; but interestingly 
multilateral interventions are associated with increasing homicide rates while unilateral interventions are not. 
This is not surprising since the argument of the article is not UN-specific, rather generalizable to sizeable 
external military intervention. NATO or African Union missions that stabilize countries of deployment should 
produce similar results, with the exception that no international organization deploys units similar to the 
UNPOL. This means that the results on UN missions’ sample are optimistic if compared to organizations that 
provide peacekeeping without deploying police units that counter unintended increases in criminal violence. 
	 21	
I extend the analysis to the sample of countries mapped in Figure 1. Thus, models in 
Table 2 have more observations and the control variables described previously.8 UN missions 
vary across regions in terms of composition, but the combination of country and region-year 
fixed effects addresses this concern. In Model 4, both UN troops and police have a significant 
effect on homicides and, as in Model 3, the effect is negative for police but positive for 
troops. In Model 5, the sample is weighted using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). CEM 
allows comparing countries that are similar except for having hosted UN missions by 
reducing the imbalance among covariates. I match countries based on pre-deployment levels 
of conflict (battle-deaths) and state fragility. In essence, CEM coarsens the sample on a set of 
variables; once observations are divided into strata, weights balance the number of treated 
(with peacekeeping) and untreated (without peacekeeping) observations in each stratum. This 
alleviates selection bias and model dependence. Following this procedure, the original 
covariate imbalance drops from 0.86 to 0.18. Results in Models 5 are in line with Model 4.  
More substantively, estimates from Model 5 reveal that moving from 0 to 1000 UN 
troops (and no UNPOL) is associated to an increase in homicide rates per 100,000 population 
from 7.1 to 8.8. In a relatively small country such as Liberia, with a population of more than 
4 million people, this corresponds to a yearly increase of 68 more homicides. It is estimated 
that to counter this increase, the UN should deploy at least 85 UN police units alongside the 
1000 additional troops. This does not mean that UNPOL to UN troops ratio should always be 
8.5:100, but such a ratio seems advisable at least until political violence is substantially 
reduced.  
																																																													
8 In Section A9 (Appendix, p.17) I present specifications that include other potential determinants of homicides 
as suggested in previous research. Because of missing data, this addition reduces the sample size. 
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Subnational case-study: South Sudan 
The country-year analysis provides initial evidence of a relationship between peacekeeping 
and criminal violence. The fundamental limitation for cross-national analysis is the level of 
aggregation; peacekeepers are not homogeneously located in host-states, thus at the country-
level we fail to observe whether variation in homicides is related to variations in UN 
personnel. Hence, I complement the country-level empirical analysis with a subnational 
analysis.  
The case of South Sudan is of particular interest since most crimes were not related to 
smuggling of natural resources or other activities commonly also carried out by rebel groups. 
Most homicides in South Sudan are the result of cattle raids, one of the main forms of 
organized crime in the country. The data also shows that there is no significant overlap 
between areas that experienced very intense conflict and those that recorded high levels of 
homicides in the aftermath of independence from Sudan. The last UNODC Global Study on 
Homicides highlighted that in South Sudan “high levels of impunity, combined with ill-
conceived DDR programs, the wide availability of weapons, and criminal opportunities 
associated with illicit markets can lead to other forms of violence, such as increased rates of 
homicides” (2013, 12). Interestingly, the same trend is also visible in Haiti, Afghanistan, 
Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Liberia – all countries that hosted UN peacekeeping missions. 
As mentioned and discussed, UNDP assisted South Sudan police in the collection of data on 
crime and homicide rates almost since its independence in July 2011. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Conflict Background  
In January 2011, a referendum for the independence of South Sudan was held. The 
referendum had been granted as part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
that officially ended the conflict between the Sudanese government and Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM). Almost 99% of participants to the referendum voted for 
independence, and South Sudan officially became independent in July 2011. In the same 
month, UNMISS was established and began transferring personnel from the terminated 
UNMIS (in Sudan) to UNMISS. The original mandate of the mission was multidimensional 
and included tasks from state-building to economic development and security sector reforms. 
The mission included troops, UNPOL, observers and civilian staff from the onset; however, 
due to the political crisis and the ensuing civil war, in 2013 UN increased troops presence in 
the country. The outbreak of civil war in 2013 force a change in the mandate toward 
humanitarian issues and protection of civilians. However, the exceptional circumstances that 
make UNMISS a not so typical mission today were largely absent in the period under 
consideration. The original mandate of UNMISS does not differ substantially from the 
mandate of other robust UN missions such as MONUSCO and UNAMSIL. It is also 
important to acknowledge that South Sudan had increasingly gained autonomy from the 
government in Karthoum. Regional autonomy was granted with the Addis Ababa agreement 
in 1972 (though reneged in 1983) and with the 2005 CPA. Hence, the day after independence, 




The unit of analysis for this subnational study is state-month. States are first-order 
administrative units of South Sudan. These ten units are analysed for 18 months (June 2011 
to March 2013). The analysis starts just before independence and the arrival of the UN 
mission. The time frame is constrained by the availability of national crime statistics. Figure 
3 shows a clear increase in homicides just after UNMISS deployment. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
As mapped in Figure 5, UNMISS deployed to all South Sudanese states as 
consequence of the decentralized strategy adopted by the mission. However, there is variation 
in size of the deployment by state. Furthermore, Figure 6 and 7 show that, overall, the 
intensity of criminal violence (homicides) does not clearly mirror patterns of political 
violence in the period under consideration. In other words, states that are torn by conflict do 
not necessarily score high on homicides. In Appendix (Section A11, p.21), I discuss 
endogeneity concerns for both troops and police showing that they are not deployed based on 
substantially differing logics, and their deployment does not respond to homicide rates. 
The first model estimated in Table 3 measures peacekeeping as the total number of 
UN personnel deployed in each South Sudanese state. The results show that larger 
contingents are statistically associated with more homicides in the following month (Model 
6). Model 7 disaggregates UNMISS by personnel, namely troops and police, showing that 
troops are positively related to homicides while a negative relation exists for UNPOL. Hence, 
the subnational analysis seems to provide support for the relationship observed at the 






[Figure 4 about here]    [Figure 5 about here]     [Figure 6 about here]
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
In more substantive terms, homicide rates move from 1.5 to 2.5 when there is one 
standard deviation increase in troops size (from 1300 to 2100) but decrease at a similar rate 
when approximately 40 UNPOL officers (at the least) are sent to the state. It is important to 
recall that troops are often in the order of thousands, whereas the police component is 
significantly smaller. As mentioned, however, UNPOL should reduce criminal violence by 
empowering national police and training officers; few tens of UNPOL usually train hundreds 
of national counterparts, which explain why relatively small number of UNPOL exert a 
strong effect on criminal violence. By comparing the plots in Figure 7, the two types of 
personnel seems to have opposite effects on homicide. 
One important corollary is that UN troops and police are usually deployed together in the 
same location. So, it could be that the UNPOL negative effect can fully mitigate the positive 
impact of UN troops when enough police are deployed alongside troops. To investigate this 
issue and estimate the net impact of UN presence on the ground on homicide rates, I interact 
UNPOL and UN troops (Model 8). Figure 8 shows the interaction effect and suggests 
UNPOL can moderate the positive effect of UN troops if at least 60 police units are deployed 
in the same location. If UNPOL numbers fall below 30, homicide rates tend to rise as more 
troops are deployed. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
[Figure 8 about here] 
Discussion and conclusions 
This article is the first to analyse the effect of peacekeeping on criminal violence. I have 
formulated the hypothesis that peacekeepers may trigger and/or facilitate criminal violence 
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for two reasons. First, peacekeepers reduce political violence and create more space for 
illegal business and criminal groups, as result of peacekeeping economies, decreasing 
instability, and the counterproductive establishment of non-state monopoly of violence that is 
limited to only addressing political violence.  
Second, the disarmament of combatants may expand the pool of individuals willing to 
"invest" their violent skills in criminal activities, sometimes independently from 
implementation and success of DDR programs and SSR. The resulting relationship between 
peacekeeping missions (as function of UN troop deployment, the main actor responsible for 
curbing political violence) and criminal violence is expected to be positive. Conversely, 
UNPOL is hypothesized to have a negative correlation with criminal violence. 
The empirical evidence provided in this manuscript supports these expectations 
robustly at different levels of analysis, with different model specifications and using different 
estimation strategies. At the country-year level, the mere presence of peacekeepers does not 
affect violence, although large missions do increase homicide rates. However, when the 
mission is disaggregated by type of personnel and relative size, presence of military 
personnel is robustly associated with more homicides. Police, on the other hand, has a 
positive impact on curbing criminal violence and although police are deployed in smaller 
contingents than troops, their beneficial impact is not dwarfed by the (unintended) nefarious 
one troops have. In fact, when deployed in the same location, UNPOL mitigates these effects 
and manages counter crime, likely by supporting and assisting national police.  
But, overall, large missions are associated with rising homicide rates consistently with 
the hypothesized security and economic effect of military missions on organized and 
individual crime. The importance of the country-level analysis is that it shows that countries 
with UN missions with significant military components experience higher levels of 
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homicides, compared to others with low or no UN presence. So, the rise in homicides is not 
simply a consequence of the post-conflict environment because i) not all countries with UN 
missions are in a post-conflict phase, and ii) the sample includes both countries with and 
without "treatment". The subnational analysis of monthly homicides and UNIMSS personnel 
deployment mirrors the country-year analysis. The Appendix further strengthens these 
conclusions with a falsification test indicating that overall levels of crimes and of non-violent 
crimes are unrelated to peacekeeping activities. Homicides and organized-crime related 
measures, on the other hand, are robustly related to troops (positively) and police 
(negatively). 
This study highlights that the focus on battle-field violence and political actors in 
most UN missions is short-sighted. New multidimensional peacekeeping involves more 
civilian-oriented tasks but troops still makeup the largest share of peacekeeping personnel. 
Considering that reducing violence is highest priority for peacekeepers, this is not surprising. 
But it does not match the broader UN strategy for peace as outlined in the 2015 HIPPO. The 
very first recommended shift put forward in the HIPPO is that peace missions “should be 
deployed as part of a broader strategy in support of a political process”, emphasizing the 
importance of protecting civilians “in all dimensions”, including criminal violence (UN 
2015). With this regard and in line with the empirical findings, the role of UNPOL is 
acknowledged as crucial. The findings of this study do not suggest that UN troops cannot 
reduce criminal violence. A fairer conclusion is that UN troops are ill-equipped to reduce 
criminal violence under current mandates that do not allow them to directly engage criminal 
actors. The UN should keep sending large contingents of blue helmets because they achieve 
the primary goal of saving lives. However, the UN should also closely monitor how 
deployment impacts other forms of violence. Awareness about how transition to peace works 
and potential side effects can improve missions’ planning in terms of sequencing and timing 
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of deployment. Future research should be devoted to unpack dynamics between conflict and 
criminal violence to uncover which mechanisms explain their non-linear relationship and 
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Table 1. Models on African sample with Dynamic PCSE  
 Model 1 




DV: Homicide Rates 
Model 3 
UN Personnel 
DV: Homicide Rates 
    
UN Troops -0.0001+  0.002* 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
UNPOL 0.001  -0.127* 
 (0.0004)  (0.030) 
PKO Dummy  0.113  
  (3.699)  
Conflict Deaths 0.007* -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.010) 
Ceasefire -0.806 -8.975* -7.773* 
 (0.590) (3.420) (3.143) 
Rebels Strength -0.520 61.417* 59.565* 
 (0.698) (11.162) (10.974) 
Num. of Rebel Groups 0.145 -13.004* -12.099* 
 (0.158) (2.835) (2.750) 
Population (log) -4.098+ 44.376* 38.739* 
 (2.229) (14.370) (17.011) 
GDP pc 0.000 0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Biased Mission 0.087 2.263 1.772 
 (0.472) (2.677) (2.285) 
DDR -0.014 9.658* 9.837* 
 (0.242) (2.648) (2.471) 
Post-Conflict -1.261* -9.129* -7.422* 
 (0.391) (2.329) (2.218) 
Observations 299 88 88 
* p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Country & Region-Year Fixed Effects Included 
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Table 2. Post-CEM Models on Global Sample with Dynamic PCSE 
 Model 4 Model 5 
 Global Sample Global Sample (CEM) 
   
UN Troops 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPOL -0.155* -0.165* 
 (0.047) (0.050) 
Conflict Deaths -0.021* -0.019* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
State Fragility -0.158 -0.058 
 (0.236) (0.212) 
Ceasefire -0.274 -0.496 
 (1.908) (1.939) 
Population (log) -9.906 -2.818 
 (7.992) (9.069) 
GDP pc -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
DDR 2.862+ 3.946* 
 (1.582) (1.807) 
Post-Conflict -1.713* -1.360* 







* p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
Panel-corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis 




Table 3. Estimation on South Sudan Mission with Dynamic PCSE 
  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 





UN Total Personnel  0.0004+   
  (0.0002)   
UN Troops   0.001* 0.003* 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
UNPOL   -0.075* 0.027 
   (0.018) (0.020) 
UNTroops#UNPOL    -0.0001* 
    (0.00002) 
UN Others   -0.006 -0.050+ 
   (0.021) (0.029) 
Conflict Deaths  0.005 0.007 0.009 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Conflict Deaths (sq)  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Population Density  -0.069 -0.078 -0.132 
  (0.105) (0.132) (0.117) 
Poverty Incidence  -0.010 -0.009 -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.027) (0.020) 
Urban Share  -0.103 -0.091 -0.101 
  (0.092) (0.096) (0.090) 
DV (Sp. Lag)  0.052 0.174 -0.040 
  (0.181) (0.181) (0.158) 
Numb. Police Stations (ln)  0.817 0.786 0.944 









* p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
Panel-corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis 





































Figure 8. Conditional effect of UN Troops by UNPOL size 
 
 
 
